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VOLUNTARY RECOGNITION OF A
MIXED-GUARD UNION UNDER SECTION
9(b)(3) OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT-BARGAINING AT
WILL: TRUCK DRIVERS LOCAL 807 v.
NLRB
Under the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (the Act),1
the right of union representation for private security guards was
comparable to that of all employees protected by the Act.2 However, upon passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, this right was
sharply limited. 3 Section 9(b)(3) prohibits the National Labor Re' National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-167 (1982)). The Act purports to eliminate the
strikes and industrial unrest that had impeded the free flow of commerce. See 29 U.S.C. §
151 (1982). Congress proposed to effect this aim by "encouraging the practice and procedure
of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing . . . ." Id.
2 See, e.g., Dravo Corp., 52 N.L.R.B. 322, 326-27 (1943) (guards are employees within

meaning of Act); In re Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co., 28 N.L.R.B. 799, 801-02 (1940)
(plant policemen may be represented by union representing production workers); In re
Luckenbach Steamship Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 181, 189 (1936) (watchmen may be represented by
union they are otherwise ineligible to join). The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
required that security guards comprise separate bargaining units from nonguards, but allowed the same union to represent both security guards and production employees within a
single plant. See, e.g., In re Chrysler Corp., 44 N.L.R.B. 881, 885 (1942) (union representing
production workers could represent plant protection workers in appropriate unit); In re
R.C.A. Mfg. Co., 30 N.L.R.B. 668, 670 (1941) (unit of plant watchmen belonging to union
representing other plant workers appropriate); see also 3 NLRB ANN. REP. 186-87 (1938)
(watchmen usually excluded from unit consisting of ordinary employees). But see In re
Sweet Candy Co., 5 N.L.R.B. 541, 544 (1938) (Board allowed unit of production workers and
guards).
3 See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, §
9(b)(3), 61 Stat. 136, 143 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(3) (1982)). Congress
passed the Taft-Hartley Act, in part, as a reaction to the Supreme Court's decision in
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 331 U.S. 416 (1947), which held that guards could be
represented by the same union that represented production workers, if the guards were in
separate bargaining units, see id. at 424-25; Labor Management Relations Conference Report, 93 CONG. REc. 6444 (daily ed. June 5, 1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE

LABOR

MANAGEMENT RELATIONS

AcT, 1947, at 1541 (1948) [hereinafter cited as 2

NLRB, LEG. HIST.]; see also infra note 28 and accompanying text (thorough discussion of
the Jones & Laughlin decision.)
The House version of the bill sought t6 remove guards from the protection of the Act,
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lations Board (NLRB or Board) from finding appropriate any bargaining unit comprised of both guards and nonguards, and from
certifying a guards' union that admits nonguard members or is affiliated with an organization that admits nonguards.4 Although
Section 9(b)(3) prohibits the Board from compelling an employer
to recognize a mixed-guard union,5 an employer may voluntarily
recognize a union disqualified from Board certification and may
also recognize a bargaining unit comprised of both guards and
nonguards.8 Recently, in Truck Drivers Local 807 v. NLRB,7 the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that under section
9(b)(3) an employer who had voluntarily recognized a mixed-guard
union may withdraw recognition upon expiration of its collective
bargaining agreement.8
see Labor Management Relations Conference Report, 93 CONG. REC. 6444 (daily ed. June 3,
1947), 2 NLRB, LEG. HIST., at 1541, however, a compromise was reached between the House
and Senate that treated guards as employees within the meaning of the Act, but restricted
their right to union representation. See id.
' Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, §
9(b)(3), 61 Stat. 136, 143 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(3) (1982)). Section
9(b)(3) provides in pertinent part:
The Board shall decide in each case ... the unit appropriate for the purposes
of collective bargaining ... Provided, that the Board shall not...
(3) decide that any unit is appropriate for such purposes if it includes, together with other employees, any individual employed as a
guard to enforce against employees and other persons rules to protect
property of the employer or to protect the safety of persons on the employer's premises; but no labor organization shall be certified as the representative of employees in a bargaining unit of guards if such organization admits to membership, or is affiliated directly or indirectly with an
organization which admits to membership, employees other than guards.
29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(3) (1982).
5 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(3)(1982); see, e.g., Drivers, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers
Local 71 v. NLRB, 553 F.2d 1368, 1372 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (section 9(b)(3) "prevents the Board
from certifying the nonguard Union as the representative of the guard-employees"); NLRB
v. White Superior Div., White Motor Corp., 404 F.2d 1100, 1103 (6th Cir. 1968) (section
9(b)(3) prohibits Board from certifying mixed guard union); In re City National Bank &
Trust, 76 N.L.R.B. 213, 214 (1948) (guard union affiliated with nonguard international
union cannot compel employer to bargain in first instance).
6 See, e.g., NLRB v. White Superior Div., White Motor Corp., 404 F.2d 1100, 1103 (6th
Cir. 1968) (not unlawful for guards to join mixed-guard union and "employer may, if it
wishes, recognize such a union"); Amoco Oil Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 1104, 1105 n.5 (1975) (Bisgyer, A.L.J., separate decision) (voluntary recognition of union representing mixed unit of
guards and nonguards does not offend § 9(b)(3)).
7 755 F.2d 5 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 225 (1985).
8 Id. at 10. Prior to the Second Circuit's decision, the duty of an employer to continue a
voluntarily assumed bargaining relationship with a union that was not qualified under §
9(b)(3) had not been defined. Compare Supreme Sugar Co., 258 N.L.R.B. 243, 246 (1981)
(employer voluntarily recognized bargaining unit of guard and nonguards; its refusal to in-
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In Truck Drivers Local 807, the collective bargaining agreement between the employer, Wells Fargo Armored Car Service
(Wells Fargo) and Local 807 of the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and Helpers of America
(Local 807 or Union) was to expire on March 16, 1980. 9 Despite
vigorous bargaining sessions, Wells Fargo's final offer was rejected
by the union's membership and a strike commenced on April 14,
1980.10 After further negotiations failed, Wells Fargo notified Local
807 that it was withdrawing its voluntary recognition of the union
as the collective bargaining representative. 1 In response to Wells
Fargo's withdrawal of recognition, Local 807 and one of its members filed unfair labor practice complaints charging Wells Fargo
with violating its statutory duty to bargain. 2 The Board issued a
clude watchmen did not violate Act) with Amoco Oil Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 1104, 1107 (1975)
(employer's failure to recognize an individual plant guard as bargaining representative for
nonguards violated Act). See generally Note, RepresentationalRights of Security Guards
Under the National Labor Relations Act: The Need for a Balancingof Interests, 12 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 657, 670 (1984)(a thorough and exhaustive study of guards' rights).
9 755 F.2d at 6.
10 Id. at 7. Wells Fargo originally recognized Local 820 of the Teamsters in 1948. Id. at
6. Locals 820 and 807 were merged, and, pursuant to a successorship clause in the collective
bargaining agreement, Wells Fargo extended recognition to Local 807 in June, 1979. Id. Local 820 had been comprised exclusively of guards, while Local 807 included both guards and
nonguards. Id. The court noted, however, that neither Local 820 nor Local 807 were qualified for certification under § 9(b)(3). Id. Section 9(b)(3) prohibits the certification of guard
unions that are either directly or indirectly affiliated with nonguard organizations. See 29
U.S.C. § 159(b)(3) (1982). While Local 820 had been comprised exclusively of guards, it was
affiliated on the national level with the Teamsters, which admits nonguards. See 755 F.2d at
6. Although Local 807 admitted both guards and nonguards, id., the bargaining unit was
comprised solely of guards, and, unlike the union, was not in violation of the first proviso of
§ 9(b)(3), see id. at 10.
11 755 F.2d at 7. Wells Fargo attributed its impasse with Local 807 to the union's failure to compromise. Id. In a letter to the union dated April 17, 1980, Wells Fargo asserted
that concessions by the employees were necessitated by economic losses incurred as the result of increased competition by non-union armored guard services. See Wells Fargo Armored Serv. Corp., 270 N.L.R.B. 787, 795 (1984) (tkin, A.L.J., separate decision), petition
for review dismissed sub nom. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 807 v. NLRB, 106 S. Ct. 225
(1985).
12 755 F.2d at 7. Section 8(a)(5) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer to "refuse to bargain collectively with the representative of his employees." See 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982). Section 9(a) of the Act, however, qualifies an employer's duty to
bargain by requiring collective bargaining only if the representative is either "designated or
selected ... by the majority of the employees" and if the bargaining unit is "appropriate."
See id. § 159(a).
Section 8(a)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to "interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section [7 of the
Act]." See id. § 158 (a)(1). Section 7 states in pertinent part:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
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complaint 13 and an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)determined
that Wells Fargo's actions were unfair labor practices in violation
of sections 8(a)(5) and 8(a)(1) of the Act.14 A divided NLRB reversed the ALJ's decision and held that the employer was privileged under section 9(b)(3) to withdraw its voluntary recognition of
Local 807.15
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ....
Id. § 157 (1982).
13 755 F.2d at 7. Section 10(b) of the Act empowers the Board to issue a complaint and
to require the parties to participate in an administrative hearing. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(b)
(1982). The office of the Board's General Counsel has the discretion to issue a complaint
upon a determination of merit, and such an issuance is not reviewable by the Board or any
court. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967); see also C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING
LABOR LAW 1618, 1697 (1983) (General Counsel of NLRB has absolute authority to issue
complaints).
In Wells Fargo, the General Counsel issued a complaint alleging violations of §§ 8(a)(5)
and 8(a)(1). Wells Fargo Armored Serv. Corp., 270 N.L.R.B. 787, 793 (1984) (Itkin, A.L.J.,
separate decision), petition for review dismissed sub nom. Truck Drivers Local Union No.
807 v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 5 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 225 (1985).
" 270 N.L.R.B. at 800 (Itkin, A.L.J., separate opinion). The ALJ handling the Truck
Driver's Local 807 case asserted that § 9(b)(3) of the Act merely precluded Board certification, and disagreed with Wells Fargo's contention that the lack of such certification justified
a withdrawal of voluntary recognition of the union. Id. at 799-800. The ALJ also determined
that Wells Fargo's decision to withdraw recognition was motivated by purely economic considerations and not by any concerns regarding conflicts of loyalty that might arise from the
mixed character of the union. Id. at 800. The ALJ held that Wells Fargo's initial voluntary
recognition of the union estopped it from withdrawing recognition, and issued a bargaining
order requiring the parties to resume their collective bargaining relationship. Id.; see also
supra note 12 (unfair labor practices under § 8(a)(1), (5) defined).
15 270 N.L.R.B. at 787 (decision of NLRB). Board Chairman Dotson and Members
Hunter and Dennis voted to reverse the AL's findings of law, while Member Zimmerman
dissented in a separate opinion, id. at 790 (Zimmerman, dissenting). The Board concluded
that the AL's opinion "gives the Union indirectly-by a bargaining order-what it could
not obtain directly-by certification-i.e., it compels [Wells Fargo] to bargain with the
Union." Id. at 787. The Board found that the distinction drawn by the ALJ between "establishing a bargaining relationship by certification and compelling continuation of an earlier
voluntary relationship" overlooked the "purpose for which section 9(b)(3) was enacted." Id.
at 788. The Board asserted that the underlying purpose of § 9(b)(3) was to "shield employers of guards from the potential conflict of loyalties" between the guard's duty to protect his
employer's property and his allegiance to nonguard employees represented by the same
union. Id. at 789. The Board stated that the potential for divided loyalty existed whether or
not the mixed-guard union was certified. Id. Thus, the Board concluded, the employer must
be free to sever the voluntary bargaining relationship to effectuate the Congressional purpose behind § 9(b)(3). Id.
In response to the General Counsel's argument that § 9(b)(3) only prohibits Board certification, the majority noted that the Board had never confined the application of the section to its literal meaning. Id. The Board cited its decision in Armored Motor Serv. Corp.,
106 N.L.R.B. 1139 (1953), as an example of the expansive manner in which § 9(b)(3) has
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On appeal, a divided Second Circuit panel affirmed the
NLRB's ruling."6 Writing for the court, Judge Metzner noted that
the Board was justified in holding that Congress had "knowingly
decreased the stability of [guards'] bargaining relationships in order" to protect employers. 17 The court examined the legislative
history of the second proviso to section 9(b)(3),1 s which expressly
precludes Board certification of a mixed-guard union and concluded that Congress disfavored such relationships.19 Furthermore,
the court inferred that the second proviso "portends more than
merely a simple check on the Board's power to certify the results
of an election"-it gives an employer the right to rely on the strictures of 9(b)(3) to withdraw its voluntary recognition of a mixedguard union. 20 Distinguishing the voluntary recognition of certifiable unions from the voluntary recognition of uncertifiable unions,
been applied. 270 N.L.R.B. at 789. In Armored Motor, the Board expanded the definition of
"guard" to include contract guards (encompassing armored car guards) as well as plant security guards. 106 N.L.R.B. at 1140. The Board reasoned, therefore, that Wells Fargo was
among the class of employers intended to benefit from the protections under the Act, and
stated that Wells Fargo's previous recognition of the union did not "estop" it from subsequently withdrawing that recognition. 270 N.L.R.B. at 789-90.
In dissent, Member Zimmerman would have limited the second proviso of § 9(b)(3) to a
prohibition of Board certification of a mixed-guard union, and would not have allowed §
9(b)(3) to be the basis for withdrawal of voluntary recognition. See id. at 791-92 (Zimmerman, dissenting). The dissent noted that the plain language of § 9(b)(3) merely prohibits the
Board from certifying a mixed-guard union seeking to represent a unit of guards, and reflects Congress' intention not to prohibit voluntary recognition of such a union. Id. at 791
(Zimmerman, dissenting).
18 Truck Drivers Local 807, 755 F.2d at 6.
17 Id.

at 10.

Id. at 8-9. The Truck Drivers Local 807 court noted that the enactment of § 9(b)(3)
was an attempt by Congress to codify the result of the Sixth Circuit's opinion in NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 154 F.2d 932 (6th Cir. 1946), rev'd, 331 U.S. 416 (1947). See
755 F.2d at 8.In Jones & Laughlin, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit voiced its
concern over the divided loyalty of plant guards and refused to enforce a bargaining order of
the NLRB which had allowed a union representing production and maintainence workers to
represent plant guards as well. 154 F.2d at 935. The Supreme Court overturned the decision
of the Sixth Circuit and held that the same union could represent guards and nonguards.
See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 331 U.S. 416, 431 (1947). For a more detailed
discussion of the Jones & Laughlin decision, see infra note 28 and accompanying text.
The majority in Truck Drivers Local 807 determined that, in enacting § 9(b)(3), Congress incorporated language significantly broader than necessary to deal with the factual
situation addressed by the Sixth Circuit in Jones & Laughlin. 755 F.2d at 9. The court
concluded that this breadth reflected Congress' concern with the more basic issue of the
divided loyalty of guard employees generally-thereby supporting the Board's interpretation that § 9(b)(3) proscribed voluntarily initiated bargaining relationships. Id.
18 See 755 F.2d at 9.
Id. at 10 (citing Teamsters Local No. 71 v. NLRB, 553 F.2d 1368, 1376 (D.C. Cir.
1977)) (mixed-guard union denied use and protection of board's processes).
18
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the court held that judicial approval of the former should not be
extended to uncertifiable unions.21
In dissent, Judge Mansfield distinguished the prohibited compulsory recognition of a mixed-guard union from Board maintenance of a bargaining relationship voluntarily initiated by the parties.22 The dissent asserted that an employer who has voluntarily
recognized an unqualified union should be required to maintain
that relationship. 2 Judge Mansfield argued that preventing arbitrary withdrawal of voluntary recognition of any union helps
achieve stability in collective bargaining agreements, thereby furthering the preeminent purpose of the National Labor Relations
Act.24 Judge Mansfield concluded that the majority's opinion
would seriously destabilize collective bargaining agreements between employers and voluntarily recognized mixed-guard unions.25
In Truck Drivers Local 807, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit construed section 9(b)(3) to allow an employer to sever
21 755 F.2d at 10. The union argued that Wells Fargo should be estopped from withdrawing its voluntary recognition. Id. The court deemed the union's estoppel argument "inconsistent with the purpose of the statute," and noted that an estoppel argument would be
viable only when a union was certifiable. Id. (citing NLRB v. A. Lasaponara & Sons, Inc.,
541 F.2d 992 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 914 (1977)). Additionally, the union argued that § 9(b)(3), as interpreted, violated its first amendment right of association. Truck
Drivers Local 807, 755 F.2d at 11. The court summarily dismissed this argument, stating
that the public interest to be protected by § 9(b)(3) outweighed the "minimal infringement"
of the union's first amendment rights. Id.
22 755 F.2d at 13 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). Judge Mansfield would limit § 9(b)(3) to a
prohibition of Board certification of a mixed-guard union. Id. at 11-12 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). Under this interpretation, an employer would be free to decide whether or not to
recognize an otherwise unqualified union at the beginning of a bargaining relationship. See
id. (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
23 Id. at 15 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
24 Id. (Mansfield, J., dissenting). Upon an examination of the legislative history of §
9(b)(3), Judge Mansfield reasoned that Congress explicitly intended not to deny guards
" . . . their rights as employees under the National Labor Relations Act." Id. at 11-12
(Mansfield, J., dissenting) (citing 93 CONG. REc. 6444, reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEG. HIST.,
supra note 3, at 1541). The dissent asserted that these rights were preserved by the precise
language of the § 9(b)(3) proscription against Board certification of a mixed-guard union,
755 F.2d at 14 (Mansfield, J., dissenting), and could not be preserved by allowing employers
to terminate bargaining relationships voluntarily established for whatever reasons the employer chose, id.
25 755 F.2d at 13 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). The dissent warned that:
The threat of instant withdrawal of recognition ... like a Sword of Damocles,
would pose such a severe penalty that the employees would, despite having established a valid, healthy and long-continued bargaining relationship, be unable to
continue it on a fair basis by invoking the protections of the Act to which they are
entitled.
Id. (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
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a voluntarily assumed bargaining relationship with a mixed-guard
union. It is suggested that this statutory construction limits the
section 7 rights of private security guards in contravention of the
Congressional intention to strike a balance between the legitimate
needs of both the employer and employee. This Comment will examine the legislative history behind the enactment of section
9(b)(3) and will suggest that the Second Circuit misconstrued the
legislative history and, as a result, misapplied the statute. In addition, it will be asserted that the Truck Drivers court gave too little
weight to the doctrine of "voluntary recognition" and thereby
failed to observe properly the rights and duties which arise as a
consequence of the voluntary recognition of a collective bargaining
representative.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION

9(b)(3)

The legislative history of section 9(b)(3) has tended to obfuscate legislative intent rather than provide meaningful guidance.2 6
The second proviso of section 9(b)(3) was enacted by Congress as a
direct reaction to the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Co., 27 in which it was held that plant guards who
were segregated in a separate bargaining unit could be represented
by a union that also represented production and maintenance
workers.2 8 Congress was concerned with the divided loyalty a plant
2 Compare NLRB v. American Dist. Tel. Co., 205 F.2d 86, 89-90 (3d Cir. 1953) (section
9(b)(3) not limited to preventing Board from enforcing unit of guards and employer's other
workers, but prohibits guards combining with any workers at place they are hired to protect) and International Harvester Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 1747, 1750 (1964) (NLRB rejected argument that statute was intended to address only situation in which non-guard plant employees and plant guards belong to same union) with NLRB v. White Superior Div., White
Motor Corp., 404 F.2d 1100, 1103 (6th Cir. 1968) (legislative history reveals that § 9(b)(3)
merely prohibits Board from certifying non-guard unions in unit determinations and certification but does not prohibit guards from joining non-guard unions) and William J. Burns
Int'l Detective Agency, 134 N.L.R.B. 451, 452-53 (1961) (section 9(b)(3) only limits Board's
ability to certify). See generally Cox, The Changing Guards: An Appraisal of Plant Guards
and Their Representation Rights, 15 LAB. L.J. 391, 395 (1964) ("NLRA Section 9(b)(3) policies and decisions are at best vague, contradictory, and in important areas, disrespectful of
Congressional intent"). It is submitted that, by limiting § 9(b)(3) to the achievement of the
single goal of eliminating the potential for divided loyalty, both the NLRB and the Second
Circuit have ignored the Congressional concern for the representational rights of guard employees revealed in the legislative history.
27 331 U.S. 416 (1947); see Labor Management Relations Conference Report, 93 CONG.
REC. 6444 (daily ed. June 5, 1947), reprintedin 2 NLRB, LEG. HIsT., supra note 3, at 1541;
see also supra note 3 and accompanying text.
28 See 331 U.S. at 424-25. The original issue in Jones & Laughlin arose during World
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guard might experience if called upon to enforce an employer's
rules against fellow union members during a strike.2 9 To alleviate
this problem, the House first proposed to exclude guards completely from the protection of the Act.30 The compromise demanded by the Senate, however, guaranteed guards their rights as
employees under the Act, but prohibited the Board from certifying
an unqualified union to represent guards.3 1 Section 9(b)(3), as enWar H at several large steel plants operated by the Jones & Laughlin Company. See 49
N.L.R.B. 390, 391 (1943) (Board decision), petition dismissed, 146 F.2d 718 (6th Cir.), remanded, 325 U.S. 838 (1945), aff'd on remand, 154 F.2d 932 (6th Cir. 1946), rev'd., 331 U.S.
416 (1947). A union which represented the production workers at the employer's plant
sought to represent the plant's guards. 49 N.L.R.B. at 391. The plant patrolmen, watchmen,
and firemen were segregated in a separate bargaining unit. See id. The Board rejected an
attempt by the company to exclude the guards from the protection of the Act because they
were sworn auxiliary military police, and subsequently ordered the employer to bargain with
the union. Id. at 392. This was consonant with the Board's policy of allowing the same union
to represent guards and production workers if they were in separate bargaining units. See
William J. Burns Detective Agency, 47 N.L.R.B. 610, 612-13 (1943); Chrysler Corp., 44
N.L.R.B. 881, 887 (1942).
The Board's order eventually was rejected by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in an
enforcement proceeding. See 146 F.2d 718, 723 (6th Cir.), remanded, 325 U.S. 838 (1945),
aff'd on remand, 154 F.2d 932 (6th Cir. 1946), rev'd, 331 U.S. 416 (1947). The court based
its decision on the fact that the guards at the employer's plants were in the military auxiliary, and, therefore, were ultimately responsible to the President as Commander in Chief.
146 F.2d at 722. The court reasoned that the "national welfare is of supreme importance
... especially... in time of war." Id. The case was granted certiorari but was remanded
by the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of the demilitarization of the plant guards
which occurred at the end of World War I.325 U.S. 838, 839 (1945), af'd on remand, 154
F.2d 932 (6th Cir. 1946), rev'd, 331 U.S. 416 (1947).
On remand, the Sixth Circuit reaffirmed its earlier decision, holding that while the
guards had indeed been released from the U.S. Army auxiliary, they were required by state
law to be members of the local municipal police force. 154 F.2d 932, 934 (1946), rev'd, 331
U.S. 416 (1947). The Supreme Court again granted certiorari and reversed the Sixth Circuit,
holding that both the Board and the War Department had agreed that the guards could be
represented by the same union representing the production workers and that this was a
reasonable interpretation of the Act. 331 U.S. 416, 424-25 (1947).
29See LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS CONFERENCE REPORT, 93 CONG. REc. 6444 (daily
ed. June 5, 1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEG.HIsT., supra note 3, at 1541. In enacting §
9(b)(3), Congress pointedly referred to "hav[ing] been impressed with the reasoning" of the
Sixth Circuit. Id.; see NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 154 F.2d 932, 935 (6th Cir.
1946), rev'd, 331 U.S. 416 (1947).
3OSee supra note 3 and accompanying text.
"ISee Labor Management Relations Conference Report, 93 CONG. REc. 6444 (daily ed.
June 5, 1947), reprintedin 2 NLRB, LEG. HisT., supra note 3, at 1541. Although the Senate
refused to adopt the House proposal to remove guards as employees covered by the Act, the
Senate felt compelled to react to the Supreme Court's decision in Jones & Laughlin. Id.
The Conference Report stated the compromise between the House and Senate as follows:
"[u]nder the language of clause (3), guards still retain their rights as employees under the
National Labor Relations Act ... but the Board is instructed not to ... certify as bargain-

ing representatives for the guards a union... admitting employees other than guards to
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acted, protects the employer from compulsory recognition of a
mixed-guard union.3 2 As the plain language of the statute and the
legislative history reveal this was a threshold protection afforded
the employer,3 3 rather than a continuing protection invocable after
an employer has voluntarily recognized a mixed-guard union.34
THE EXPANDED COVERAGE OF SECTION

9(b)(3):

Armored Motor Service MISAPPLIED
In the Armored Motor Service decision in 1953, the NLRB extended the scope of section 9(b)(3) to include armored car guards
protecting a customer's property.s The Board in Armored Motor
membership." Id. The first proviso of § 9(b)(3), which makes bargaining units of guards and
nonguards inherently inappropriate, was merely a codification of existing Board procedure.
See Cox, supra note 26, at 393. The second proviso of § 9(b)(3), which prohibits the Board
from certifying a union affiliated with a nonguard union, was a codification of the Sixth
Circuit's opinion in Jones & Laughlin. See 93 CONG. REC. 6444 (daily ed. June 5, 1947)
reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEG. HIST., supra note 3, at 1541.
" See supra note 5 and accompanying text. The prohibition of Board certification of
mixed-guard unions effectively prevents the Board from conducting a representation election or from issuing a bargaining order to compel the employer to negotiate with a mixedguard union even though the mixed-guard union may represent a majority of the employees
in the bargaining unit. See, e.g., Drivers, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers Local No.
71 v. NLRB, 553 F.2d 1368, 1372 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (section 9(b)(3) "specifically prevents"
NLRB from allowing nonguard union to represent guards); NLRB v. White Superior Div.,
White Motor Corp., 404 F.2d 1100, 1103 (6th Cir. 1968) (Board may not certify or deem
appropriate any mixed union or unit, but "employer may . . . for purposes of collective
bargaining").
33 See supra note 4 (text of § 9(b)(3)); supra notes 3 & 26-31 and accompanying text
(legislative history).
" See Truck Drivers Local 807, 755 F.2d at 15 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
"
See 106 N.L.R.B. 1139, 1140 (1953) (armored car guards are statutory guards within
meaning of § 9(b)(3)) (overruling In re Brink's Inc., 77 N.L.R.B. 1182 (1948)). Prior to the
decision in Armored Motor Service, Board precedent had restricted the statutory definition
of "guard" to "plant guard." See, e.g., In re American Dist. Tel. Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 1228, 1231
(1950); In re Brink's Inc., 77 N.L.R.B. 1182, 1185-86 (1948) (both cases overruled by Armored Motor Serv. Co. Inc., 106 N.L.R.B. 1139, 1140 (1953)). It can be argued that the
expansion of the definition of "guard" for § 9(b)(3) purposes was outside the contemplation
of Congress. See, e.g., Truck Drivers Local 807 v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 5, 15-16 (2d Cir. 1985)
(Mansfield, J., dissenting) (hesitancy with which term "plant guard" extended to armored
car guard troublesome); Drivers, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers Local No. 71 v.
NLRB, 553 F.2d 1368, 1377 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting) (legislative history
"clearly reflects [that] Congress had in mind 'plant policemen and guards' "); Kahn, The
NLRB's Misrepresentationof the Guard Provision, 35 LAB.L.J. 328 (June, 1984) ("NLRB
has stretched ... definition of guard so far and in such an imprecise manner that it now
threatens such diverse nonguard jobs as deliverymen, postal workers, parking garage attendants, and truck drivers"). This interpretation of § 9(b)(3), however, has been consistently
upheld, see Local 851, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. NLRB, 732 F.2d 43, 44 (2d Cir.
1984), and has been extended even further, see, e.g., Wright Memorial Hosp., 255 N.L.R.B.
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Service had "distilled" section 9(b)(3) into what the Board deemed
to be its essential purpose-to address "the danger of divided loyalty"-and applied it to a non-plant guard situation in which the
"danger.

.

. may not be quite so far-reaching."36 The Second Cir-

cuit in Truck Drivers Local 807 based its decision in part on the
expanded coverage of section 9(b)(3) as construed by the Armored
Motor Service decision. The Board in Armored Motor Service,
however, had focused on the definition of "guard" under section
9(b)(3) and had not sought to broaden the protection of employers
when dealing with a mixed-guard union beyond the bar to certification of an unqualified union. 8 It is submitted, therefore, that the
Second Circuit's reliance on Armored Motor Service was misplaced
because the decision does not mandate an expansion of the protection afforded an employer under section 9(b)(3).
VOLUNTARY RECOGNITION AND BOARD PROTECTION: EQUAL TO
ELECTION IN ALL WAYS, SAVE ONE

In Truck Drivers Local 807, the court acknowledged the legitimacy of voluntary recognition as a means of establishing a repre1319, 1320 (1981) (ambulance department employees who work night shifts are statutory
guards); MDS Courier Serv., 248 N.L.R.B. 1320, 1320 (1980) (non-uniformed delivery drivers driving own cars were guards under statute). But see Viking Bag Div., Shurfire-Central
Corp., 161 N.L.R.B. 648, 650 (1966) (appropriate unit consisted of workers who performed
watchmen as well as cleanup functions); Sears Roebuck & Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 32, 33-34 (1966)
(powerhouse employees tangentially responsible for merchandise security, not guards).
38 106 N.L.R.B. at 1140 (1953). In Armored Motor Service, the Board reasoned that a
"conflict of loyalty could arise" if armored car guards were to deliver valuables to customers
whose striking employees were fellow members of the guard's union. Id.
37 See Truck Drivers Local 807, 755 F.2d at 9. In Truck Drivers Local 807, the court
cited the Armored Motor Service decision as a clear indication that both the Board and the
courts have refused to restrict § 9(b)(3) to the factual situation addressed by the Sixth
Circuit in Jones & Laughlin, thereby permitting the court to expand the protections afforded employees under § 9(b)(3). Id.
38 106 N.L.R.B. at 1140. In Armored Motor Service, the Board noted that Congress
could not have intended § 9(b)(3) to be limited to plant guards. Id. The construction given
the statute in determining the protection afforded an employer under § 9(b)(3), it is submitted, is important for present purposes. Once the Board determined that armored car guards
were within the ambit of § 9(b)(3), it turned to the language of the statute and concluded
that it prohibited the Board from certifying the petitioning union. Id. at 1139. While the
Board in Armored Motor Service dealt only with a union petitioning for certification and is,
therefore, distinguishable from the voluntarily recognized union in Truck Drivers Local 807,
it is suggested that the Armored Motor Service decision did not address the type of protection afforded an employer under § 9(b)(3); it was concerned only with the type of employee
covered by the statute. Section 9(b)(3) defines a guard as one who "enforce[s] against employees and other persons rules to protect property of the employer or to protect the safety
of persons on the employer's premises." 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(3) (1982).
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sentative of the employees.39 Notwithstanding the acknowledgement that voluntary recognition of a union is a viable alternative
to a Board election,40 the court refused to provide Local 807 with
the protections ordinarily afforded a voluntarily recognized
union.4 1 The court asserted that the policy behind section 9(b)(3)
and Local 807's status as an uncertifiable, mixed-guard union, precluded Local 807's use of Board processes.4 2 This interpretation, it
is submitted, would allow employers to dominate bargaining relationships with voluntarily recognized unions by threatening withdrawal of recognition to gain leverage during negotiations. It is further submitted that the Second Circuit's analysis improperly
ignored the guidance provided by the Supreme Court in NLRB v.
43
Gissel Packing Co.
In Gissel, the Court forcefully rejected the argument that the
39

755 F.2d at 8.

40 See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 596-97 (1969). Although a Board-

conducted election is the "preferred and, today, the most widely used method of determining a union's status as bargaining representative," see K. McGuiNEss, How TO TAKE A CASE
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD § 52, at 47 (4th ed. 1976), the Court in
Gissel held that other methods are valid routes to establish the majority status of a bargaining representative. 345 U.S. at 596-97. "Almost from the inception of the Act . . . it was
recognized that a union did not have to be certified as the winner of a Board election to
invoke a bargaining obligation." Id.; see also NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget Inc., 584 F.2d 293, 297
(9th Cir. 1978) (voluntary recognition, equated with certification for purposes of presumption of majority status), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979); NLRB v. Lasponara & Sons Inc.,
541 F.2d 992, 995 (2d Cir. 1976) ("[o]nce a collective bargaining agent is voluntarily recognized by an employer as the representative of its employees the bargaining relationship
must be permitted to continue and recognition may not be withdrawn at will"), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 914 (1977); A Guide to Basic Law and Procedure Under the NLRA, reprintedin J.
GETMAN & J. BLACKBURN, LABOR RELATIONS, LAW AND POLICY 86 (2d ed. 1983) ("Act does not
require that ... [bargaining] representative be selected by any particular procedure"). In
addition to Board elections and voluntary recognition, bargaining orders are well-established substitutes to other representative selection processes. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S.
736, 742-43 (1962); see also Affeldt, BargainingOrders Without an Election: The National
Labor Relations Board's "FinalSolution", 57 Ky. L.J. 151, 152 (1968-1969) (Board's power
to issue bargaining order without election derives from § 10(c) of the Act).
"' 755 F.2d at 10 (citing Teamsters Local 71 v. NLRB, 553 F.2d 1368, 1376 (D.C. Cir.
1977)). It is suggested that while certifiability may well be a condition precedent to a union
demand for a Board-conducted election, certifiability is not required for the Board to afford
the protections of the Act to a voluntarily recognized mixed-guard union. See infra note 54
and accompanying text.
42 755 F.2d at 8. The court addressed an argument by Local 807 which cited NLRB v.
Lasponara & Sons Inc., 541 F.2d 992 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 914 (1977), as
standing for the proposition that Wells Fargo should be estopped from withdrawing its voluntary recognition. 755 F.2d at 10. The court distinguished Lasponara,stating: "[tihat case
applies only to the situation in which a certifiable union is voluntarily recognized. . . . We
are dealing here with an uncertifiable union." Id.
43 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
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Taft-Hartley amendments had eliminated voluntary recognition as
an alternative means of determining the majority status of a bargaining representative by "providing for a Board election as the
sole basis of a certification. ' 44 Although the Court noted that certification afforded a union certain "special privileges, 4 5 it stated
clearly "that a union did not have to be certified as the winner of a
Board election to invoke a bargaining obligation." 6 Unlike the majority in Truck Drivers, the Gissel Court made no distinction between voluntarily recognized certifiable and uncertifiable unions,
14See id. at 600; NLRB v. Heck's Inc., 398 F.2d 337, 338-39 (4th Cir. 1968), rev'd on
other grounds sub noma. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). The Heck court
held that the Taft-Hartley amendments made a Board election the sole basis for Board
certification, and, as a consequence, an employer was justified in rejecting a union demand
for recognition based solely on employee authorization cards. 398 F.2d at 338-39. Chief Justice Warren disagreed, stating "that the 1947 amendments did not restrict an employer's
duty to bargain under section 8(a)(5) solely to those unions whose representative status is
certified after a Board election." 395 U.S. at 600; see Christensen & Christensen, Gissel
Packing and "Good Faith Doubt": The Gestalt of Required Recognition of Unions under
the NLRA, 37 U. CHL L. REV. 411, 415-17 & n.19 (1970); Lesnick, Establishment of Bargaining Rights Without an NLRB Election, 65 MiciL L REv. 851, 861-62 (1967); Pogrebin,
NLRB Bargaining Orders Since Gissel: Wandering From a Landmark, 46 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 193, 199 (1971).
" Gissel, 395 U.S. at 598-99 & n.14. The Gissel Court stated that "[a] certified union
has the benefit of numerous special privileges which are not accorded unions recognized
voluntarily or under a bargaining order... ." Id. at 598-99. The Court in Gissel summarized
these benefits as: the certification bar under § 9(c)(3); protection against picketing by rival
unions under § 8(b)(4)(c); freedom from restrictions in work assignment disputes under §
8(b)(4)(d); and freedom to picket for recognitional or organizational purposes under §
8(b)(7). Id. at 599 n.14; see United Mine Workers v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62,
70-72 & n.4 (1956); NLRB v. White Superior Div., White Motor Corp., 404 F.2d 1100, 1103
& n.5 (6th Cir. 1968); K McGuiNEss, supra note 40, at 204-11.
46 395 U.S. at 598. As the Supreme Court had previously noted in Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., a union need not "be certified by the Board, or even be eligible for such certification" to seek a bargaining order under § 8(a)(5). 351 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1956). The Arkansas
Oak case was cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Gissel, 395 U.S. at 597, and by
Judge Mansfield in dissent in Truck Drivers Local 807, 755 F.2d at 12 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). Nowhere in the Act, it is submitted, is it required that a bargaining representative
be certified to be the majority representative of the employees in an appropriate bargaining
unit or to avail itself of the Board's unfair labor practice machinery.
The court in Truck Drivers Local 807 also noted that, prior to the passage of the Taft
Hartley Act, a proposed amendment to make certification a standing prerequisite to the
bringing of a § 8(a)(5) complaint was before Congress. 755 F.2d at 9-10 n.1. In interpreting
Congress' failure to pass the amendment, the court stated: "Congress' refusal may mean
that uncertified unions which may be eligible for certification have rights under Section
8(a)(5), but it does not necessarily follow that uncertifiable unions have the same rights."
Id. (emphasis in original). However, the Supreme Court in Gissel thought otherwise, holding
that the failure to enact this very amendment was an affirmative action by Congress not to
require certification as a condition precedent to the use of Board processes. See 395 U.S. at
597-98.
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but looked instead to the employer's act of acknowledging the legitimacy of the union's majority position among the employees as
establishing the bargaining relationship.4 7 Once a union is recognized, by whatever method, its entitlement to NLRB protection
vests4 8 and the ensuing bargaining relationship cannot lightly be
overturned.4 9
THE PRESUMPTION OF CONTINUED MAJORITY STATUS
To ensure stability in collective bargaining relationships, once
the majority status of the representative is established, a judicially
created presumption of continued majority status attaches.5 0 Thus,
with respect to Board certified representatives, a "certification
bar" prevents either an employer or a rival union from contesting
the majority status of an incumbent union for one year."1 With regard to voluntarily recognized representatives, this presumption
exists for a reasonable time, often following the one year rule for
certified unions.2 The contract bar serves a similar purpose when
the parties are operating under an existing collective bargaining
agreement. 53 In post contract situations, the distinction between
395 U.S. at 597-98 (quoting United Mine Workers v. Arkansas Flooring Co., 351 U.S.
62, 71, 72 n.8 (1956)).
11 See 395 U.S. at 596-600; see also Seger, The Majority Status of Incumbent Bargaining Representatives, 47 TUL. L. REv. 961, 961-63 (1973)(voluntary recognition or certification by election immunizes union from being prevented from acting as bargaining
representative).
" See 495 U.S. at 598-99; NLRB v. Bel-Air Mart, Inc., 497 F.2d 322, 328 (4th Cir.
1974); infra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
"0See Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 104 (1954); NLRB v. Broad St. Hosp. & Med.
Center, 452 F.2d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 1971).
" Brooks, 348 U.S. at 104; see also Seger, supra note 48, at 961-66 (certification permits union to be bargaining representative for one year following election).
52 See NLRB v. Broad St. Hosp. & Med. Center, 452 F.2d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 1971);
NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 399 F.2d 409, 412 (7th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Universal
Gear Serv. Corp., 394 F.2d 396, 397-98 (6th Cir. 1968); Keller Plastics Eastern, Inc., 157
N.L.R.B. 583, 586 (1966); see also C. MORmS, supra note 13, at 527; Seger, supra note 48, at
1001-02 (non-certified representative should have reasonable time to bargain).
See, e.g., William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 134 N.L.R.B. 451, 453 (1961).
In Burns, the Board held that a union which is uncertifiable under § 9(b)(3) is given the
benefit of the contract bar rule. Id. The Board expressly overruled Columbia-Southern
Chem. Corp., 110 N.L.R.B. 1189 (1954), which denied a mixed-guard union the benefit of
the contract bar. See 134 N.L.R.B. at 453. The Burns Board determined that this exceeded
the statutory mandate of § 9(b)(3). Id. The Board may return to the rule of ColumbiaSouthern. See Wells Fargo, 270 N.L.R.B. at 787 n.4. "In reversing the judge, we find it
unnecessary to pass on whether ... Wells Fargo would have been privileged to withdraw
recognition within the contract term." Id. Member Zimmerman, in dissent, deemed this language in clear derogation of the rule in Burns and portentous of a return to the rule of
47

13
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certified and voluntarily recognized bargaining representatives
fades and the employer must have a good faith doubt of the
union's continued majority status before he may rebut the presumption.5 4 The Second Circuit, by allowing Wells Fargo to withdraw voluntary recognition "at will," refused to apply the presumption of continued majority status to Local 807. 55 The court
based this refusal on Local 807's status as an uncertifiable mixedguard union under section 9(b)(3). 5 6 It is submitted that, as the
voluntarily recognized representative of the employees of Wells
Fargo, Local 807 was entitled to the benefit of the rebuttable presumption of continued majority status and, as a consequence,
Wells Fargo's withdrawal of recognition was a violation of its section 8(a)(5) duty to bargain in good faith.
CONCLUSION

Section 9(b)(3) was enacted by Congress to remedy the problem of the divided loyalty that a security guard might be susceptible to if called upon to enforce an employer's rules against fellow
union members. In Truck Drivers Local 807, however, the Second
Circuit construed section 9(b)(3) to allow Wells Fargo to withdraw
Columbia-Southern. Id. at 791 n.1. (Zimmerman, dissenting). The Second Circuit agreed
with Member Zimmerman, concluding that a withdrawal during the contract term would be
an unfair labor practice. See Truck Drivers Local 807, 755 F.2d at 10.
4 See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d 293, 297, 304-05 (9th Cir. 1978)
(voluntary recognition is equivalent of certification with respect to presumption of majority
status); Hutchison-Hayes Int'l, Inc., 264 N.L.R.B. 1300, 1311 (1982) (employer did not rebut
presumption of continued majority status of incumbent bargaining representative since it
lacked "reasonable doubt of the Union's majority status"); Bartenders, Hotel, Motel and
Restaurant Employee Bargaining Ass'n, 213 N.L.R.B. 651, 651-53 (1974) (majority status
attaches to incumbent bargaining representative even though voluntarily recognized and
uncertified).
5" See Truck Drivers Local 807, 755 F.2d at 10. In International Tel. & Tel., 159
N.L.R.B. 1757 (1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1039 (1968), the Board held that the employer
is estopped from withdrawing recognition when a thirteen-year history of consensual recognition and six prior collective bargaining agreements existed. See id. at 1761-62. The Board
in Wells Fargo distinguished InternationalTelephone on the basis of the long bargaining
relationship between the parties and the fact that, in the words of the Board, "here, by
contrast, the parties' relationship was less than 1-year old when recognition was withdrawn." Wells Fargo, 270 N.L.R.B. at 789. It is submitted that this distinction is fallacious
because the same bargaining unit was represented by an unqualified mixed-guard union
since 1948, and the "union" contemplated by the Board was the result of a merger of locals
which was never contested by Wells Fargo. In fact, Member Dennis disassociated herself
from this distinction and found the length of the bargaining relationship to be irrelevant to
the issue of voluntary withdrawal. Id. at 790 n.20.
" Truck Drivers Local 807, 755 F.2d at 10.
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its voluntary recognition of Local 807 at will. The Second Circuit

has thereby elevated section 9(b)(3) to a position which Congress
did not intend. The expansion of the class of employees covered by
section 9(b)(3) along with the NLRB's denial of the protections of
the Act to voluntarily recognized mixed-guard unions, threatens to
create a growing class of employees afforded second-rate rights to
union representation."
James P. McCabe

See Brink's Inc., 272 N.L.R.B. 868, 869 (1984); University of Chicago, 272 N.L.R.B.
873, 874 (1984). In these recent cases, the NLRB has embarked on a broad-based retraction
of the rights of security guards to choose mixed-guard unions as their bargaining representatives. In University of Chicago, the Board refused to allow a mixed-guard union to intervene
in a Board-conducted election. See 272 N.L.R.B. at 871. The Board in University of Chicago overruled Bally's Park Place, 257 N.L.R.B. 777 (1981), and Willian J. Burns Int'l
Detective Agency, Inc., 138 N.L.R.B. 449 (1962), and expressly disavowed the holding of
Rock-Hill Uris, Inc. v. McLeod, 236 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd, 344 F.2d 697 (2d
Cir. 1965). See 272 N.L.R.B. at 874 n.8, 876. Rock-Hill had held that an unqualified union
could intervene in a Board election, with the Board merely "certifying" the mathematical
results. 236 F. Supp. at 398. In University of Chicago, Member Zinmerman asserted that
the majority's approval of Columbia-Southern Chem. Corp., 110 N.L.R.B. 1189 (1954), heralded the demise of the Board's policy of extending the contract bar doctrine to mixedguard unions, see 272 N.L.R.B. at 280 (Zimmerman, dissenting). In Brink's Inc., the Board
refused to allow a clarification of a unit of guards who were represented by a mixed-guard
union. See Brink's Inc., 272 N.L.R.B. at 864-70. The Board's rationale in Wells Fargo, University of Chicago, and Brink's Inc. has been that the legislative purpose of § 9(b)(3) necessitated an abandonment of a literal reading of the proscription on Board certification and
mandated the affirmative denial of all Board processes to mixed-guard unions. See University of Chicago, 272 N.L.R.B. at 877 (Zimmerman, dissenting). As Member Zimmerman
stated in University of Chicago: "In all three cases, [the NLRB based] these conclusions on
what they perceive to be the purpose and intent of Section 9(b)(3) . . . [this] view is premised on a flawed interpretation of the language and history of Section 9(b)(3)." Id. (Zimmerman, dissenting).

